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Arthur Fine†,‡
Some facts on which we can agree: no epistemic argument supports a
robust form of realism in general as against an equally robust form of
antirealism. For example, none of “provides a better explanation for,” or
“accounts better for the success of,” or “makes more intelligible than” tilts
the balance in general one way or another. But are there perhaps heuristic
arguments? Einstein, famously, encountered calculations by Lorentz using
an auxiliary temporal variable, took them realistically, and so was led
to the “proper time” of special relativity. And he did it again, turning
Planck’s expedient of fictional clumps of emitted energy (which need not
“really exist somewhere in nature”) into the “light quanta” that account
for the photoelectric effect and that we know today as photons. In these
circumstances a realist attitude seems to have motivated work that led
to significant scientific progress. Exactly the opposite seems to have been
true in subsequent developments concerning the quantum theory, where the
positivism or instrumentalism of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli marked out
progressive paths as against the realist ideas of Schrödinger, de Broglie, or
Einstein.1 So with respect to realism and antirealism there may be times to
reap and times to sow. Really?
I don’t think so. That is, I do not think there are reliable “best
practice” guides that link generic scientific tasks (build theories, measure
parameters, look for novel phenomena, etc.) with meta-attitudes like realism,
or instrumentalism, or empiricism. Except for the Feyerabendian “anything
goes” (or as I prefer “anything might go”), there are no dialectical laws for
scientific practice. Just as realism (along with other metaphysical attitudes)
fails to be rationally required for understanding science, it also fails in a
general or generic way to be required for doing science (“scientific progress”).
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Here is why. Suppose that Hendrik proposes a way to calculate the
apparent shrinkage that a moving rod seems to undergo in the direction of
motion. His calculation uses a certain auxiliary variable t′. Albert, struggling
to take in the basis for the novel calculation, thinks (realism) that maybe
t′-time with respect to the moving rod really is different from t-time on the
stationary reference system. Voila! Special relativity. But Mileva, working
alongside Albert, notes that doing things Albert’s way—including how one
might go further (for example by trying to connect energy and rest mass in
one nifty equation)—would be just as well motivated by the thought that
t′-time is a good (useful, reliable) way of treating time with respect to the
moving rod. No further attitude about the “reality” of times yields further
dividends in terms of motivation. The same is true with respect to Max and
Albert over the quanta of energy. Real? Useful fictions? It does not matter
for doing good work.
This line of argument is much the same as the indifference argument of
the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) that matches realist moves with
antirealist moves in their endless pas de deux over how best to understand
science (Fine 1986). The claim here is that indifference applies to motivation
as well as to understanding. Of course Mileva does not deny that in fact
Albert’s penchant for realism contributed to his pursuit of light quanta. Nor
would she deny that it played a role in his later dissent from the quantum
theory, where he did not pursue developments. The claim is that other
attitudes could have had much the same motivational force. This is like
the position of constructive empiricism with respect to explanation: if the
search for explanation does generally lead to empirical adequacy, then the
constructive empiricist who knows this has as much motivation to pursue
explanations as does an explanation-hungry realist. And the point of the
claim is to subvert any argument that says if you want progress here it
would be better to be a[n] —ist.
In a thoughtful examination of these issues, Robin Hendry (2001) agrees
about parity in the arguments over how “best” to understand science but
denies that this parity entails indifference of motivation. Curtis Forbes
(2016) makes a similar move, supporting it with a perceptive study of how
different meta-attitudes affected nineteenth century electrodynamics (in the
cases of Weber, Helmholtz, and Maxwell). The parity in arguments over
understanding scientific practice, they think, does not extend to motivations
because there are practices that may involve beliefs and inferences only
available to one party (say realists, or instrumentalists) and hence could not
be motivated otherwise. Hendry concentrates his argument on two practices:
conjoining theories and accepting multiple incompatible models. The idea
is that only realists will want to conjoin theories and only antirealists will
want to work with incompatible models. So where these practices occur they
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point differentially, either to realism or to antirealism, in terms of motivation.
But do they? Take conjunction first. The instrumentalist wants theories that
work, not just in terms of predicting the phenomena (or empirical adequacy)
but also in terms of other virtues, like fruitfulness, for example, in connecting
usefully with other theories or models. I call theories with the desired virtues
“reliable” (Fine 2001). It follows that an instrumentalist who looks to each
of theories X and Y as being reliable has reason to think that connecting
them will be reliable as well, and so to pursue the conjunction. As for
incompatible models, the realist of course cannot accept incompatibles as
true. The instrumentalist is in a similar boat since incompatibles cannot
both be reliable. But both realists and instrumentalists can expect to learn
from incompatibles how to pursue their respective goals (truth, reliability)
better, and meanwhile they can make the best (in their own terms) of what
they have. There are no compelling arguments here, as elsewhere, that show
important general differences between decent realist or antirealist attitudes
either in understanding or in motivating practice.
What then of beliefs and inferences that might make a difference?
Certainly if I believe that there are nano-widgets and that they are important
scientifically, I (may) have good reason to try to find and measure them.
(I say “may” since I might be engaged elsewhere.) If I don’t believe in
nano-anythings, you might think I have no reason to search for nano-widgets,
surely not in order to measure them. But suppose I believe that searching
for nano-widgets and their measures could be scientifically useful. Maybe
the experimental techniques themselves would be valuable in developing new
tools of research. Maybe the search seems likely to turn up important, reliable
information (though probably not about nano-widgets). Maybe, an excellent
way to understand the big-widgets all around us is to model them using the
fiction of nano-widgets, and the search will help to improve the model. John
Dewey, in the course of a spirited rejection of what we call the “pessimistic
meta-induction,” highlights just such considerations:
But the very putting of the question ... induces modification
of existing intellectual habits, standpoints, and aims. Wrestling
with the problem, there is evolution of new technique to control
inquiry, there is search for new facts, institution of new types
of experimentation; there is gain in the methodic control of
experience. And all this is progress. (Dewey 1916, 101)2
2 Dewey continues, “It is only the worn-out cynic, the devitalized sensualist, and the
fanatical dogmatist who interpret the continuous change of science as proving that,
since each successive statement is wrong, the whole record is error and folly; and that
the present truth is only the error not yet found out.” (Dewey 1916, 101)
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In line with Dewey, I see no practice motivated by a search for truth that
could not be motivated just as strongly in a quest for reliability. Parity
between truth and reliability marks a permanent impasse in arguments
between realists and instrumentalists. The impasse does not disappear when
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